More haste, less speed One so-called innovation for which NPfIT was originally praised was the speed and efficiency of its procurement and contracting process.
In particular, it was not clear even from the outset of NPfIT exactly what was going to be delivered to the ultimate end-users.
A number of significant service providers have fallen by the wayside during the course of the NPfIT project simply because of the difficulty of delivering what NPfIT wanted within its timescales and risk profile, and against a moving timeframe.
But it does illustrate that anything other than a "one customer, one service provider" structure is very difficult to operate. The last time I did, I was with my GP for 25 minutes: This email address is already registered. Poor contracting process The NPfIT procurement model called for a drastic cut in timescales, with no negotiation allowed, contracts offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis and a very aggressive approach to legal remedies against service providers.
Ever since NPfIT began, there have been concerns expressed by key stakeholders within the health system, especially doctors and GPs, about the accessibility and utility of the planned system.
NPfIT rushed to award contracts in almost indecent haste with insufficient planning, particularly for such a large contract. Good managers on ICT and outsourcing projects are always asking themselves whether the original course of action is correct and whether adjustments are required - and they are prepared to take the ultimate decision at the right time and not delay the inevitable.
Share this item with your network: Many of the lessons that can be learned from the failure of NPfIT are no more than commonsense. The combination of the implemented payment provisions under which service providers had to do all the work upfront with no payments until successful delivery and the harsh termination and liability provisions, meant that the risks being absorbed by service providers were extremely high.
Please check the box if you want to proceed. One of the lessons that should be learned is that projects will always run into trouble if they try to complete the contractual paperwork before actually working out the scope of what a project is about, what its deliverables will be and how they will be implemented.
No-one could argue that there must always be a desire to procure and award contracts as efficiently as possible. You have exceeded the maximum character limit. It is a hallmark of successful ICT and outsourcing projects that there should be good consultation with all stakeholders involved, including particularly end-users.
But there is a big gap between laudability and deliverability. Add to that the entrenched interests in NHS trusts about loss of control over their own systems and you have an inherently suspicious, if not downright hostile, user base.
This includes a failure to understand and align the commercial drivers and what value is intended from the project. Part of the rationale for this approach was that different regional service providers could be swapped in or out if and when other regional service providers failed.
Negotiation was a dirty word and NPfIT used heavy-handed tactics to ram through contract terms that were considerably harsher than had ever been seen within a government or even private sector context before.
You almost feel sympathy for those in the Department for Health whose role has been to try to salvage something from the project over the past three to four years - and also for service providers who invested a lot of time, resources and money in pursuing and attempting to deliver on contracts that were aggressively drafted but poorly specified.
I agree to my information being processed by TechTarget and its Partners to contact me via phone, email, or other means regarding information relevant to my professional interests. NPfIT and its advisers appeared to forget the golden rule that these contracts involve a long-term relationship; so a hyper-aggressive approach to supplier management is counter-productive.
Together, we experienced a system that was slow, cumbersome, insufficiently explained and poorly implemented. Clear accountability is fine indeed, essential but accountability needs to be in the right hands and with the right checks and balances.
NPfIT was run by a very strong project director with a powerful personality.Watch video · Simon Stevens said the NHS was undertaking contingency planning on Brexit as she steps out once again amid custody battle Things looked like business as usual the Daily Mail, The Mail on.
This process describes the process for business planning within Northern Lincolnshire and Goole NHS Foundation Trust. The aims of this process are to ensure that the business planning process. Please provide a Corporate E-mail Address. 30% of ICT project failures are as a result of poor strategy and business planning.
This includes a failure to understand and align the commercial. Business case approval process – capital investment, property, equipment and ICT The NHS England Business Case Approvals Process for Capital Investment, Property, Equipment and ICT was published on 14 August Business Plan /17 NHSBSA Business Plan /17 (V1) 2 Contents 1.
About us 3 2. Introduction 6 to support the wider NHS. /17 Business Plan process more efficient and increasing the debts we recover. SAMPLE BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLAN PREFACE The purpose of this plan is to define the recovery process developed to restore [your The following Business Contingency Plan and all related procedures are approved by Name Title Phone Email Plan Coordinator Sr.
Management Line Management Human Resources Safety .Download